Capabilities

Device identity + zero trust

Identity and access controls for an industrial control plane: who can change what, when, and why.

Design intent

Use this lens when adopting Device identity + zero trust: define success criteria, start narrow, and scale with safe rollouts and observability.

Scoped roles separate design, deploy, and operate responsibilities
Auditing provides accountability without slowing teams down
Break-glass should exist, but be explicit and reviewable

What it is

An automation SaaS needs strong user/device identity and authorization so deployments and configuration changes are controlled and auditable.

Design constraints

Scoped roles separate design, deploy, and operate responsibilities
Auditing provides accountability without slowing teams down
Break-glass should exist, but be explicit and reviewable

Architecture at a glance

Identity: users + devices; Authorization: actions scoped to sites/devices/projects
Secure channels for control plane and telemetry paths
Audit trails tie changes to snapshots and deployment actions
This is a capability surface concern: security must be operational, not theoretical

Typical workflow

Define roles and scopes (site/device/project) before scaling users
Enable least-privilege paths for deployments and configuration edits
Rotate credentials and validate secure connectivity at the edge
Audit: verify snapshot + deployment actions are traceable

System boundary

Treat Device identity + zero trust as a capability boundary: define what success means, what is configurable per site, and how you will validate behavior under rollout.

Example artifact

Authorization policy (conceptual)

role: commissioning-engineer
allowed:
  - action: deploy_snapshot
    scope: site:*
  - action: edit_io_mapping
    scope: site:*
denied:
  - action: manage_identities
    scope: *

What it enables

Role-based permissions for engineering vs operations
Safer collaboration across teams
Audit trails tied to change events

Engineering outcomes

Scoped roles separate design, deploy, and operate responsibilities
Auditing provides accountability without slowing teams down
Break-glass should exist, but be explicit and reviewable

Quick acceptance checks

Separate roles for design, deploy, and operate
Ensure all deploy/promote actions are audited

Common failure modes

Over-broad permissions causing unsafe changes under pressure
Device identity drift: credentials copied or reused across devices
TLS/cert lifecycle issues leading to silent disconnections
Audit gaps: changes not tied to snapshots or missing change notes

Acceptance tests

Least privilege: validate that only authorized roles can deploy/change config
Edge trust: validate device identity and secure channel establishment
Audit trail: confirm actions are logged with snapshot/deployment IDs
Verify the deployed snapshot/version matches intent (no drift)
Run a canary validation: behavior, health, and telemetry align with expectations
Verify rollback works and restores known-good behavior

Deep dive

Practical next steps

How teams typically turn this capability into outcomes.

Key takeaways

Scoped roles separate design, deploy, and operate responsibilities
Auditing provides accountability without slowing teams down
Break-glass should exist, but be explicit and reviewable

Checklist

Separate roles for design, deploy, and operate
Ensure all deploy/promote actions are audited
Use least privilege and regular permission reviews
Plan break-glass procedures with stronger logging

Next steps

Common questions

Quick answers that help align engineering and operations.

What permissions should be rare?

Promotion to production and fleet-wide deploy. Those actions should be gated, audited, and sometimes require approvals.

How do we keep teams moving fast without losing safety?

Use scoped roles, approvals on high-risk actions, and progressive rollouts. Speed comes from repeatability and clear guardrails.

What’s a practical audit baseline?

Who did what, when, on which snapshot, to which targets, and what the rollout outcome was.